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EXPORT INTENSITY OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES: THE ROLE OF TRADE FINANCE AVAILABILITY 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the relationship between the role of trade finance availability and the export 
intensity of foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs). In developing our 
hypotheses, we draw upon insights derived from “new” internalisation theory (international 
business literature) and international trade finance (international economics literature). We 
empirically test these hypotheses using survey data compiled from subsidiary managers in 
six ASEAN countries, supplemented with host-country level data. We conceptualise, 
empirically test, and establish that the subsidiary-level capability in combining and utilising 
internal and external debts is an important subsidiary-specific advantage to support export 
intensity. We find that subsidiaries employ intra-firm loans from MNE internal capital 
markets and, to some extent, bank loans from external financial institutions to boost their 
export intensity. Subsidiaries may have concerns about foreign exchange risks, but the use 
of appropriate foreign exchange risk management is positively associated with export 
intensity. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice. 
Keywords: financing subsidiary exports; subsidiary export intensity; subsidiary-specific 
advantages; new internalisation theory. 
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EXPORT INTENSITY OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES OF MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES: THE ROLE OF TRADE FINANCE AVAILABILITY1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over half of international trade in the world is conducted by the largest multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and their foreign subsidiaries (Rugman & Collinson, 2012). Even when 
exports are not the initial mandate for a subsidiary, many subsidiary managers discover new 
ways to combine their local knowledge with resources from the parent firm in order to 
develop new business opportunities outside of a national market (Birkinshaw, 1996). In 
cases where the parent firm does not establish a foreign subsidiary in each host country, or 
where the geographic distance from the headquarters (HQs) to export markets is high, it is 
more viable for the parent firm to bestow a foreign subsidiary which is located near export 
markets with a mandate to sell products and services internationally. Furthermore, a 
subsidiary may develop strategic specialised resources and acquire a world product mandate 
(D'Cruz, 1986; Rugman & Bennett, 1982). A subsidiary’s mandate is broadly defined as a 
business or a part of a business in which the subsidiary is involved and for which it has duties 
beyond its national market (Birkinshaw, 1996). Indeed, it has been agreed that a subsidiary’s 
mandate may be extended to include exports, because exporting is central to the overall 
strategy of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; Estrin, Meyer, Wright, & Foliano, 2008; 
Nguyen, 2014, 2015; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015b). 
Financing is instrumental in the export success of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. Exporting 
involves substantial fixed and variable costs, a longer trading time relative to domestic trade, 
and increased risks (e.g. exchange rate movements) (Foley & Manova, 2015; Manova, 
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2013). Subsidiaries may also require more capital to finance equipment for export-oriented 
production (Manova, 2013) or service provision. Sufficient working capital and liquidity are 
needed to allow them to offer attractive terms of payment and thus win purchase orders and 
contracts from foreign customers. They are also needed for the execution of shipments and 
deliveries (Antràs & Foley, 2015). Most of these large upfront costs cannot be funded 
through retained earnings and internal cash flows from operating activities (Foley & 
Manova, 2015; Manova, 2013; Manova, Wei, & Zhang, 2015). We explain this point in 
detail in the theoretical development section. This is referred to as (international) trade 
finance: the financing of international trading activities. Thus, the financing of subsidiary 
exports requires the availability of internal and external debts (i.e. intra-firm loans, bank 
loans, and export credit finance). 
However, little is known about the financing of exports of MNE foreign subsidiaries. Many 
of the previous international business (IB) studies on the subsidiary export mandate in 
particular (Birkinshaw, 1996), as well as subsidiary management in general, pay little or no 
attention to finance considerations and the financial management strategies of foreign 
subsidiaries (Aulakh & Mudambi, 2005; Mudambi, 1999; Nguyen, 2013; Nguyen & 
Rugman, 2015a). As such, our academic and managerial understanding of this important 
topic that underlies subsidiary export success is significantly limited. 
This study aims to address this limitation and contributes to the literature examining how the 
exports of foreign subsidiaries are financed. We build upon “new” internalisation theory 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003), which is an extension of “classic” internalisation 
theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981), in the IB literature. “New” 
internalisation theory postulates that firm-specific advantages (FSAs) can be created by both 
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parent firms and by foreign subsidiaries. These FSAs are strengths and benefits of the firm 
relative to its rivals, which arise from product and process technology, innovation, R&D, 
brands, finance resources and access to finance, and management skills. If FSAs are 
developed at the subsidiary level, they allow national responsiveness in a host-country 
economy, a type of location-bound (LB) FSAs, and they are known as subsidiary-specific 
advantages (SSAs). Furthermore, we also draw upon insights from the international 
economics (IE) literature into international trade finance and multinational activity. It is 
noted that we focus on factors within the control of subsidiaries and that we aim to address 
two key research questions: 
(i) How do foreign subsidiaries use internal and external debt finance to support 
export intensity? 
(ii) Do subsidiaries’ perceived concerns about foreign exchange (FX) risks affect 
their export intensity? What are the effects of using FX risk management on 
subsidiary export intensity? 
We empirically test our hypotheses using survey data from the subsidiary managers of 
British MNEs in six countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and control for a 
wide range of alternative explanations. The ASEAN bloc is an interesting context for our 
research. It is one of the most open economic regions in the world, with total merchandise 
exports of over $1.2 trillion – nearly 54% of total ASEAN GDP and 7% of global exports 
(Asian_Development_Bank, 2015). Member countries are characterised by rapid economic 
growth and their active involvement in the world economy. They are growing markets that 
provide business opportunities, as well as being important sources of inputs for MNEs such 
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as products, technology, value-adding capabilities, commodities, and labour (Nguyen, 2014; 
Rugman & Collinson, 2012). As a group, the ASEAN bloc has free-trade agreements with 
Japan, Korea, China, India, Australia, and New Zealand (ASEAN+6). Moreover, ASEAN 
member-country governments support the export initiatives of multinational subsidiaries, 
which help to promote national competitiveness and improve balances of payments. 
British MNEs are among the largest and the most active investors in the ASEAN bloc, and 
they have achieved significant international success (Yip, Rugman, & Kudina, 2006). Our 
survey results show that manufacturing and service ASEAN subsidiaries of British MNEs 
are predominantly driven by market-seeking motives, in which exports contribute to 
profitable growth. 
Our study makes three new contributions to the IB literature. Firstly, our core theoretical 
contribution is to conceptualise, empirically test, and establish that the financing of exports 
by MNE foreign subsidiaries is an important SSA. Specifically, we highlight that, relative 
to the HQs, foreign subsidiaries have in-depth knowledge and understanding of the 
underdeveloped financial markets in the host countries in the context of emerging 
economies. Furthermore, these subsidiaries develop sustainable export financing strategies 
to overcome these challenges. Foreign subsidiaries are often well positioned to tap into MNE 
internal capital markets (Aulakh & Mudambi, 2005; Foley & Manova, 2015; Mudambi, 
1999; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a; Rugman, 1980). Furthermore, we show that foreign 
subsidiaries can access external debt finance not only from local banks within the host 
countries but also from international banks outside of them, which arise from the benefits of 
multinationality and the international nature of the MNE (Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003; 
Eiteman, Stonehill, & Moffett, 2012; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a; Rugman & Collinson, 
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2012). These multiple funding sources help these subsidiaries to overcome the credit 
constraints of external capital markets in the host countries and take advantage of differences 
in the cost of financing across countries. Thus, the subsidiary-level capability in recombining 
and utilising internal and external debts as trade finance sources is conceptually an important 
SSA (a type of LB FSA). As such, we extend “new” internalisation theory with a specific 
focus on financing subsidiary export intensity. This is an interesting and new theoretical 
contribution, given that the extant IB literature that focuses on subsidiary export mandates 
(Birkinshaw, 1996) but pays no attention to the important role of trade finance availability 
and the development of subsidiary-level sustainable export financing strategies. 
Secondly, we develop a parsimonious model to examine how the financing of exports and 
the use of FX risk management affects subsidiary export intensity. Our distinct and 
innovative approach, which clearly demarcates the differences between intra-firm loans and 
bank loans, is an innovation in this field. Previous studies of international trade and 
multinational activity in the IE literature, which introduces corporate finance as a 
consideration, have not distinguished between sources of finance, although it is identified as 
a particularly important matter (Foley & Manova, 2015). Furthermore, the role of intra-firm 
trade finance is under-researched empirically, meaning that it is critical to tackle this relevant 
issue. Our empirical evidence illustrates the important role of internal debt in supporting 
subsidiary export intensity, which is consistent in all statistical models. To a certain extent, 
subsidiaries might combine intra-firm loans with external debt if it is accessible and 
available. We also find that subsidiaries may have concerns about FX risks but that the use 
of appropriate FX risk management is positively associated with export intensity. 
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Thirdly, our innovative research approach of integrating the perspectives of “new” 
internalisation theory and international trade finance is original. The results provide useful 
new insights into the relationship between trade finance availability and export intensity at 
the subsidiary level, which has been largely under-researched in the IB literature. Our 
findings offer important strategic implications for subsidiary managers and policymakers 
regarding the contributions of MNE foreign subsidiaries in promoting the exports, finance, 
and ultimately economic growth of the host countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
synthesis and discusses how trade finance availability enhances the export intensity of the 
subsidiary. The third section is dedicated to theory development and the generation of 
hypotheses, while the fourth section describes the data and the methods employed to test 
these hypotheses. The subsequent sections present the results of the analyses and discuss the 
findings. The final section is the conclusion, including a discussion of the limitations of this 
research and suggestions for the direction of future research. 
2. LITERATURE SYNTHESIS AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 “New” internalisation theory 
“Classic” internalisation theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981) 
is a firm-level theory that explains the existence, the function, and the reasons why the MNE 
exerts proprietary control over knowledge-based FSAs by creating a network of foreign 
subsidiaries instead of exporting or licensing. Internalisation theory recognises 
imperfections in goods and factor markets, information asymmetries between sellers and 
buyers, market failure in information and knowledge, and government regulations, such as 
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trade barriers and tariffs. This forces firms to create their own internal markets, and the 
process of internalisation permits MNEs to overcome the externalities. 
“Classic” internalisation theory predicts that particular configurations of FSAs are created 
and subsequently deployed and recombined with other complementary resources abroad if 
required (Rugman, 1981; Verbeke, 2013). The FSAs are a set of strengths specific to firms 
and relative to their rivals, such as R&D knowledge, patented technology, brands, 
trademarks, financial resources and access to capital markets, and international management 
skills (Rugman, 1981; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011). When MNEs expand 
internationally, they transfer FSAs developed in home countries to foreign subsidiaries in 
host countries. The benefits of FSAs must outweigh the liability of foreignness, which 
includes the additional risks and costs of doing business abroad (Hymer, 1960/1976; Zaheer, 
1995). Moreover, “classic” internalisation theory also considers the role of the firm’s 
external business environment, and the concept of home and host country-specific 
advantages is indicative of this perspective (Rugman, 1981). 
“Classic” internalisation theory has been subject to a number of extensions, eventually 
forming “new” internalisation theory. This can be observed in the works of several authors 
(Benito, Petersen, & Welch, 2009; Buckley & Casson, 1998, 2009; Chen, 2005, 2010; 
Hennart, 2009; Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003; Verbeke, 2013). The theoretical 
focus has shifted from (a) explaining parameters that would stimulate firms to expand across 
borders and investigating entry mode choice to (b) the MNE’s internal organisation and its 
capabilities (Verbeke & Kano, 2015). Rugman et al. (2011) and Rugman and Nguyen (2013) 
have provided a comprehensive literature review on the development of internalisation 
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theory, the dynamics of resource recombination, and the creation of new knowledge by both 
parent firms and foreign subsidiaries. 
Rugman and Verbeke (1992) make an important extension of internalisation theory by 
introducing the concept of non-location bound NLB FSAs and location bound LB FSAs. 
The NLB FSAs (e.g. technology, marketing, or administrative knowledge) are typically 
developed at the HQs and internationally transferred to the entire network of the MNE, 
bringing the benefits of economies of scale and scope. In contrast, the LB FSAs are 
idiosyncratic strengths with limited geographic deployment and exploitation potential. The 
LB FSAs are tied to certain subsidiaries, whether in the home country or host countries. 
They can include stand-alone resources linked to location advantages (e.g. a network of 
privileged retail locations), local resources, local best practices, and routines. If developed 
at the subsidiary level, these FSAs allow national responsiveness in a host country. They are 
not transferrable to the network of the MNE. However, some LB FSAs can become best 
practices and be transformed into NLB FSAs (for a comprehensive discussion, see Rugman 
et al. (2011)). 
In reality, the MNE faces difficulties in transferring FSAs to foreign subsidiaries due to the 
tacit nature of knowledge and location-boundedness of FSAs (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). 
This necessitates the development of new knowledge, capabilities, and strategic resources 
by foreign subsidiaries. They are known as SSAs, which are fundamentally context-specific. 
They are not only locally embedded but also path-dependent on the subsidiary’s earlier 
technological and organisational trajectories. Rugman and Verbeke (2001) have identified 
10 distinct patterns of SSAs’ development and building of competence across borders in 
foreign subsidiaries that result from particular interactions between FSAs and country-
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specific advantages (CSAs). Rugman and Verbeke (2003) have maintained that each 
subsidiary commands idiosyncratic SSA bundles. These SSAs arise from the innovative 
combination, recombination, and bundling of knowledge and resources from the parent firm 
with new knowledge and resources created by the foreign subsidiary in a local business 
environment. 
Furthermore, Birkinshaw (1996, 1997), Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), Cantwell and 
Mudambi (2005), Nguyen and Rugman (2015a), among other studies, capture this subsidiary 
development beyond headquarters-driven strategy to include a subsidiary’s world product 
mandates, export mandates, competence creation, and subsidiary initiatives (a type of 
corporate entrepreneurship). This reflects the dynamic capabilities of the MNE and the 
subsidiary and emphasises the view that knowledge and competence can be developed 
anywhere in the MNE network by both the parent firm and the foreign subsidiary (Rugman 
& Nguyen, 2013; Rugman et al., 2011; Verbeke, 2013). 
In addition, Rugman and Verbeke (2003) show that the focus on FSAs advanced earlier by 
Rugman (1981) in “classic” internalisation theory that predates the resource-based view of 
the firm (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984). However, it is entirely compatible with the 
implications of the resource-based view with its emphasis on unique resources, capabilities, 
and core competencies. The concept of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) 
in the strategic management literature is compatible with the concepts of NLB FSAs, LB 
FSAs, and the patterns of SSA development in foreign subsidiaries, resource recombination, 
and bundling in “new” internalisation theory (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001, 2003) (for a 
discussion, see Rugman et al. (2011)). 
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On the other hand, we make an effort to interconnect IB and IE because our study benefits 
from the IE literature in examining the role of trade finance and subsidiary export intensity. 
Related works by economists that pay attention to some aspects of “classic” internalisation 
theory, following insights from the seminal works of Buckley and Casson (1976), Casson 
(1979) and Rugman (1981), appear in Ethier (1986), Ethier and Markusen (1996), Helpman 
(1985), and Horstmann and Markusen (1989). 
The transfer of knowledge-intensive FSAs from HQs to foreign subsidiaries in the IB 
literature is known in the IE literature as the transfer of HQs services (e.g. management, 
financial, and/or marketing services). The concept of HQs services (initially understood as 
blueprints) is coined by Helpman (1985) and revisited and extended by Antràs (2003), and 
Antràs and Helpman (2004). HQs services are a joint input across plants, creating firm-level 
scale economies, also referred to in the literature as multi-plant economies of scale. It is 
argued that HQs services are often knowledge based and can be provided to additional 
production facilities at low or zero marginal cost (Markusen & Maskus, 2001). In addition, 
the IE literature examines the choice between FDI and exporting as being exemplified in the 
proximity-concentration trade-off (Brainard, 1993). The property rights problem of the firm 
in the IB literature is related to the hold-up problem described by Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and extended to the MNE by Antràs (2003) in the IE literature. 
More recently, Cuadros, Martín-Montaner, and Paniagua (2016) develop a gravity model 
using country-level data to explain how credit constraints affect the transfer of HQs services 
(specifically financial services), as well as how migrants can provide valuable information 
about local finance, and thereby eased the credit constraints foreign investors faced during 
the 2007 financial crisis. 
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It is interesting to observe that the IE literature has developed theoretical models that 
rationalise the emergence of the MNE at the level of the parent firm (Antràs, 2003; Antràs 
& Helpman, 2004; Ethier, 1986; Ethier & Markusen, 1996; Helpman, 1985; Horstmann & 
Markusen, 1987; Markusen, 1984). In contrast, “new” internalisation theory in the IB 
literature analyses both the parent firm and the subsidiary, and shifts the view of the MNE 
as a hierarchical organisation steered by firm-level HQs toward an analysis of the MNE as 
an interdependent network of subsidiaries differentiated by roles and capacities (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997; O'Donnell, 2000; Rugman, 2014; Verbeke & 
Kano, 2015; Zander, 1998). Thus, in this study, we demonstrate how MNE foreign 
subsidiaries develop unique financial management capabilities in combining internal and 
external debt financial resources to fund export activities. This helps them to overcome the 
challenges of underdeveloped financial markets in emerging economies and to grow and 
expand their export business despite challenging external environments. 
2.2 Theory development: Financing exports of foreign subsidiaries is an important 
subsidiary-specific advantage 
There is a large volume of research in the IE literature establishing that financial 
development is associated with long-term economic growth (for a review, see Levine 
(2005)). At the cross-country level, King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine, Loayza, and 
Beck (2000), and Fisman and Love (2007) show that financial development promotes 
growth and general economic activity. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001, 2005) report 
in their cross-country time-series studies that financial liberalisation boosts economic growth 
by improving the allocation of resources and the investment rate. By using cross-country 
data at the firm and industry levels, respectively, Demirgüç, Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
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and Rajan and Zingales (1998) demonstrate that reduced access to external finance is 
associated with slower growth. 
Moreover, the finance, macroeconomic, and economic development literatures have 
emphasised the variation in financial constraints across firms (Beck, Demirgüç, Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2005; Forbes, 2007). Financial frictions shape MNE activities and cross-border 
capital flows (Antràs & Caballero, 2009; Antràs, Desai, & Foley, 2009). However, there are 
few insights into how internal and external trade finance availability affects the export 
intensity of foreign subsidiaries. 
Financial arrangements to provide working capital and the required liquidity associated with 
international trade are often referred to as (international) trade finance (Antràs & Foley, 
2015; Foley & Manova, 2015; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). In some respects, international 
trade finance resembles domestic trade credit extended between buyers and suppliers 
(Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004; Foley & Manova, 2015; Giannetti, Burkart, & Ellingsen, 2011; 
Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2012; Ng, Smith, & Smith, 1999; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). 
According to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), many firms offer trade credit to their customers 
in order to win purchase orders and contracts, even though they have to take bank loans and 
their suppliers’ trade credit to finance their operations. 
Financing is central to a subsidiary’s export strategy because exporting involves substantial 
fixed and variable costs (Foley & Manova, 2015; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015). Fixed 
costs include gauging market profitability, investing in product customisation and regulatory 
compliance, and setting and managing foreign distribution networks (Manova, 2013). 
Variable costs include freight, insurance, and duties. The international trade cycle is 
relatively long: the time between the start and completion of a transaction is often 60 days 
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longer than it would be when trading locally (Djankov, Freund, & Pham, 2010; Foley & 
Manova, 2015; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015). Exporting entails increased risks. For 
example, FX rate movements can change the value of the expected cash flows of exports, 
and they require the implementation of appropriate exchange risk management strategies. 
We argue that foreign subsidiaries need to develop sustainable export financing strategies. 
It is essential to recognise that, unlike HQs, foreign subsidiaries of Western MNEs operating 
in Southeast Asia in our research context have in-depth local knowledge of idiosyncratic 
challenging business environments, especially in the context of underdeveloped financial 
markets (Singapore is the only exception, with a developed capital market). Subsidiaries face 
challenges in accessing domestic capital due to the following factors: a limited availability 
of external credit opportunities; the high costs of borrowing due to external capital market 
imperfections, as well as limited FX hedging services due to the short supply of hard foreign 
currencies; and weak banking systems (Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a; Stephens, 1998). Thus, 
we argue that they utilise intra-firm loans from MNE internal capital markets (Aggarwal & 
Kyaw, 2008; Aulakh & Mudambi, 2005; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004; Dewaelheyns & Van 
Hulle, 2010; Gugler, Peev, & Segalla, 2013; Mudambi, 1999), and combine with bank loans 
(if they are accessible and available) from external financial institutions to support their 
exports, and use appropriate FX risk management techniques to deal with perceived concerns 
surrounding exchange rate risks in export transactions. 
Rugman (1980) was the first to develop the concept of internal capital markets within the 
MNE from the perspective of “classic” internalisation theory. This involves arguing that the 
MNE is able to overcome segmented international capital markets, as well as that it can 
operate an efficient internal market within its own organisational structure. Indeed, 
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convincing empirical evidence shows that MNEs use their own internal capital markets when 
there are differences in financial developments and costs of financing between home- and 
host-country capital markets (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2008; Aulakh & Mudambi, 2005; Desai 
et al., 2004; Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, 2010; Gugler et al., 2013; Mudambi, 1999). 
Furthermore, we argue that MNE foreign subsidiaries can raise external debt financing at 
competitive and favourable terms and conditions not only from local banks in the host 
countries but also from international financial institutions outside the host countries (Doukas 
& Pantzalis, 2003; Eiteman et al., 2012; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a; Rugman & Collinson, 
2012). The access to financial resources from multiple countries (Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 
2008; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a) enables foreign subsidiaries to overcome the credit 
constraints which they may face in the host countries. This reflects the finance-factor 
competitive advantages of MNEs over purely domestic firms (Oxelheim, Randøy, & 
Stonehill, 2001). 
On the other hand, we suggest that exports cannot be financed through limited internal funds 
(retained earnings) and cash flows from operating activities. Retained earnings, which are a 
type of internal equity financing (Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a), may be used to fund other 
investment alternatives, such as R&D, innovation, and knowledge creation activities rather 
than exports. By its nature, R&D is intangible and offers little or no collateral value for debt 
finance. Because of severe information asymmetries between firms and external investors 
about the likelihood of success of R&D, debt is precluded as a financing source for R&D. 
Empirical evidence in the finance literature evidences a strong negative association between 
R&D and leverage across firms, supporting the idea that debt is poorly suited to fund R&D 
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(for a survey, see Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009); Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen 
(2013); Brown and Petersen (2011); Hall and Lerner (2010)). 
In summary, we theorise that the capability to combine financial resources of intra-firm loans 
from MNE internal capital markets with bank loans (if any) from external financial 
institutions in an effective and innovative way to enhance export intensity by foreign 
subsidiaries is conceptually a valuable SSA (a type of LB FSA). In this way, we extend 
“new” internalisation theory with a specific focus on the financing of subsidiary export 
intensity by emphasising that only local foreign subsidiaries can develop such a LB FSA 
relative to the parent firms. The HQs lack sufficient knowledge about the financial 
development of the host countries to engage in an efficient and effective combination of 
financing sources to support subsidiary export intensity. Local subsidiaries can understand 
and operate successfully within the idiosyncratic nature of the financial markets in ASEAN 
countries. Thus, when we examine export financing at the subsidiary level, it is important to 
modify analysis accordingly, as each subsidiary develops individual LB FSAs. As such, our 
theoretical contribution to extending “new” internalisation theory is novel, given that we 
focus on the development of subsidiary-level trade finance to support export intensity. 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Trade finance availability and subsidiary export intensity 
Previous studies in the IE literature provide firm-level evidence related to the UK, Belgium, 
China, Italy, and Japan that implies a relationship between financial resource availability 
and firms’ export product scope, number of destinations, and value of foreign sales 
(Greenaway, Guariglia, & Kneller, 2007; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015; Manova & 
Yu, 2012; Minetti & Zhu, 2011; Muuls, 2008). The IE literature also examines to what extent 
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trade credit between sellers and buyers, foreign direct investment, and portfolio investment 
can compensate for weak financial institutions (Antràs & Foley, 2015; Manova, 2008; 
Manova et al., 2015). 
We suggest that the availability of trade finance (a type of finance-factor FSA) helps MNE 
foreign subsidiaries to improve their ability to convert export opportunities into actual sales. 
For example, the availability of trade finance may enable foreign subsidiaries to offer 
attractive terms of payment to buyers, enhancing their competitiveness in export markets 
and making it easier for them to maintain successful trading relationships. According to a 
survey report by the IMF (2009), importer finance (cash in advance) corresponds to 19-22% 
of international trade transactions, exporter finance (open account) accounts for 42-48%, and 
bank intermediation (letter of credit and documentary collection) accounts for the rest. 
The IMF survey results suggest that because of intense competition in export markets, 
foreign buyers press exporters to offer open account terms, and exporters who do not do so 
may lose sales to their competitors. However, exporters should thoroughly examine the 
export markets and the creditworthiness of their foreign buyers to ensure that payment is 
received in full and on time. It is possible to substantially mitigate the risk of non-payment 
associated with open account payment terms by using trade finance techniques, such as 
factoring and export credit insurance (Trade_Finance_Guide, 2012). 
Our theoretical setup here is consistent with the study by Antràs and Foley (2015). These 
scholars theoretically and empirically examine international trade finance practices, which 
involves the financing terms (cash in advance versus post-shipment, letter of credit versus 
post-shipment, and cash in advance versus letter of credit) that support international trade. 
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The choice of trade finance terms arguably needs to balance the risk of an importer defaulting 
on an exporter and/or the possibility of an exporter not delivering goods as specified. 
On the one hand, we argue that MNE foreign subsidiaries need sustainable sources of 
external debt finance (bank loans) that can be secured with collaterals. Such external 
financial resources are used to fund production for export shipments, service provision, and 
liquidity requirements while waiting to receive payment. This involves the effective 
planning and management of working capital during the international trade cycle. For 
example, during pre-shipment finance, once they have a confirmed order, backed by a 
documentary letter of credit, they might discuss obtaining working capital with their banks 
to help them to produce and ship the goods or to provide services. This allows them to take 
on new contracts and grow their business. As for post-shipment finance, once a subsidiary 
has shipped goods to a customer or delivered services, they may need to obtain a loan from 
their bank, rather than waiting for the customer’s payment before using the funds 
(Lloyds_Bank, 2016). 
Our subsidiary-level theoretical perspective is aligned with findings from previous studies 
in the IE literature that illustrate how institutions that facilitate access to capital give rise to 
a comparative advantage in sectors that require external finance (Antràs & Caballero, 2009; 
Beck, 2002; Kletzer & Bardhan, 1987; Manova, 2008, 2013). Thus, we can expect external 
debt finance to play a major role in supporting subsidiary export intensity. 
On the other hand, we argue that MNE foreign subsidiaries have access to internal debt 
finance (intra-firm loans) from their parent firms and/or sister affiliates through the use of 
MNE internal capital markets, which helps to facilitate their exports. Manova et al. (2015) 
study export behaviours of domestic and multinational subsidiaries in China, employing 
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appropriate statistical techniques to address potential endogeneity concerns. They use 
transaction-level customs data from China and find that foreign subsidiaries and joint 
ventures export 62% and 50% more, respectively, than domestic firms in sectors that are 
relatively highly reliant on costly external finance. Empirical evidence suggests that MNE 
subsidiaries exploit their internal capital markets to overcome fixed trade costs, which 
domestic firms may be incapable of doing. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
multinational subsidiaries might be more likely to operate in more financially vulnerable 
sectors because they face less competition from local firms there. Thus, we can expect that 
internal debt finance plays an important role in enhancing the export intensity of a subsidiary. 
Based on these arguments, we produce the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Intra-firm loans are positively associated with a subsidiary’s export 
intensity. 
Hypothesis 1b: Bank loans are positively associated with a subsidiary’s export intensity. 
3.2 Foreign exchange management and subsidiary export intensity 
Exchange rate volatility influences export’s behaviour of firms and international trade flows 
(Arize, Osang, & Slottje, 2008; Bernard & Jensen, 2004; Campa, 2004; Ekanayake, Thaver, 
& Plantel, 2012; Salomon & Shaver, 2005). Exchange rate risks increase transaction costs, 
create uncertainty in exporters’ earnings, and reduce income from international trade. 
Indeed, there is evidence that exchange rate volatility negatively impacts on firms’ level of 
exports, an effect that is magnified for financially vulnerable firms and dampened by 
financial development (Héricourt & Poncet, 2015). Thus, FX volatility is a matter of concern 
for subsidiaries when they engage in exports, and it thus has a potentially negative impact 
on export intensity. 
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On the other hand, we argue that it is more important to examine whether or not foreign 
subsidiaries take the necessary actions to manage FX risks instead of speculating on FX 
fluctuations. This requires them to recognise the implications of FX exposures on their 
exports and/or to coordinate with the corporate treasury in the HQs to centrally manage FX 
risks. This is a type of NLB FSA. Bowe, Filatotchev, and Marshall (2010) and Marshall 
(2000) document that MNEs and their foreign subsidiaries use a wide range of hedging 
techniques in FX risk management. These involve the use of formal contractual 
arrangements with financial institutions. An example of this is taking positions in FX 
derivative instruments, such as forward and option contracts. 
On the other hand, ASEAN subsidiaries have developed unique subsidiary-level FX risk 
management through experiential learning from the challenges of volatile FX rate 
fluctuations in the 1997 Asian currency crisis (Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a). The baht 
(Thailand), rupiah (Indonesia), and ringgit (Malaysia) were sharply devaluated, and the 
operating results of these subsidiaries were negatively affected. Companies made strategic 
decisions to introduce effective tools to reduce the risks of losses resulting from FX volatility 
(Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a). They invested significant efforts in sourcing input materials 
from local suppliers for their final export products in order to reduce adverse impacts of 
having to pay for imported inputs in strong foreign currencies. For example, Clay (2005) 
documents that Unilever Indonesia increased the use of local sourcing from local suppliers 
during the Asian currency crisis. 
Furthermore, they could not rely on formal hedging techniques of forward and option 
contracts because these types of financial derivatives may not be available due to the 
shortage of supply of strong foreign currencies and weak banking systems in Southeast Asian 
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countries (Stephens, 1998). Also, currency controls, currency inconvertibility, and 
restrictions on fund transfers by host countries’ regulations made it infeasible to centrally 
manage FX risks through HQs’ corporate treasuries or centralised shared services. This 
experience has been immensely valuable in helping these subsidiaries to smoothly navigate 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a). In other words, they 
have developed LB FSA (SSAs) in FX risk management using alternative solutions. Thus, 
we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: The perceived concerns of FX risks are negatively associated with a 
subsidiary’s export intensity. 
Hypothesis 2b: The use of FX risk management is positively associated with a subsidiary’s 
export intensity. 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Research context and primary data 
We use an original survey dataset with foreign subsidiaries of the largest British MNEs in 
six Southeast Asian countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam) for several reasons. Firstly, British MNEs are amongst the first to 
internationalise, and they have achieved significant success in many industries (Yip et al., 
2006). Secondly, they have been doing business in Asia (Iran, India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
China, Russian Asia, and Japan) since 1860 (Davenport-Hines & Jones, 2003). Today, they 
are amongst the largest and most active of foreign investors, having made important 
contributions to the economic and social development of the host countries (Nguyen, 2013). 
 23 
Thirdly, the findings from the study of behaviours of foreign subsidiaries of British MNEs 
may be generalisable to those of other Western MNEs. 
ASEAN countries are of particular interest to the research questions of this study. Firstly, 
they have development strategies that are largely geared toward attracting FDI from MNEs, 
promoting trade liberalisation and international competitiveness in the world economy 
through regional free-trade agreements and regional economic integration and cooperation. 
Secondly, they support export initiatives of multinational subsidiaries. Thirdly, the choice 
of the ASEAN context extends the empirical setting of previous studies on subsidiary 
management, whose samples have primarily been drawn from subsidiaries of Western 
MNEs operating in advanced countries, such as the UK, the US, Canada, Sweden, and 
elsewhere in Europe (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; 
Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Kawai & Strange, 2014; Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2004; Taggart & Hood, 1999). 
We used several data sources to compile a complete list of foreign subsidiaries of British 
MNEs in ASEAN countries. These sources include the OneSource Global Business Browse 
database by Thomson Reuters, Reuters Research Inc., published by Avention Inc., parent 
firms’ websites and their annual reports, and British, American, and European Chamber of 
Commerce websites in ASEAN host countries. The OneSource database provides only basic 
information, such as name, address, industry, and so on, without providing any financial data 
related to these subsidiaries. We found a total population of 504 foreign subsidiaries of 
British MNEs in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
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There were no subsidiaries in Cambodia and Laos, and there were very few in Brunei 
Darussalam. Thus, we focused our efforts on contacting subsidiaries in six countries. 
We developed a 40-question survey specifically designed for the ASEAN context and to 
collect data for several research papers on subsidiary strategy and performance. This study 
on subsidiary trade finance and export intensity is one of them. We carefully designed our 
questions, which were based on theories of IB, finance, and international accounting 
standards (e.g. IFRS8–Operating Segments and IAS24-Related Party Disclosures). Most of 
our questions were fact based, which subsidiary managers can answer by extracting data and 
information from their accounting and reporting systems. We used simple and concise 
English language to construct our survey. We pre-tested our questionnaire with five 
experienced subsidiary managers to ensure that they had no difficulties in understanding our 
questions. However, these managers indicated that because of the confidential and 
commercially sensitive nature of the information that we aimed to collect, they would not 
provide their latest, up-to-date information. Instead, they were willing to provide recent 
historical data, related to the five-year period of 2003-2007. We conducted our survey 
between 2010 and 2011. 
We approached managers of 504 subsidiaries across six ASEAN countries by e-mail to invite 
them to participate in the survey. The e-mail survey method gave us opportunities to interact 
with subsidiary managers, to obtain their insights, to ask follow-up questions, and to collect 
additional information. However, it was a challenging, laborious, and time-consuming 
process. It took us eight months to send several rounds of invitations and friendly reminders 
to subsidiary managers to encourage them to participate in the survey. 
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We received usable responses from 101 subsidiaries. Our study achieved a response rate of 
20%, which compares favourably to the extant literature (Harzing, 2000), given that 
obtaining information from multinational subsidiaries is fraught with difficulties and 
reluctance to provide data (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Andersson et al., 2002). Our 
questionnaire was responded to by the top management teams, who had an average of eight 
years of working experience in the ASEAN bloc. 
Insert_Table_1_about_here 
Table 1 shows that subsidiaries in Singapore account for 26%, Indonesia 18%, Vietnam 
18%, Thailand 15%, Malaysia 13%, and the Philippines 10%. All are private subsidiaries, 
meaning that their shares are not listed on the stock exchanges in the host countries and that 
they are therefore not subject to financial information disclosure requirements. The survey 
is the only method that can be used to obtain data and information. 
The average invested capital of the participating subsidiaries was US$78 million. The 
average age of the subsidiaries at the time of survey was 26 years. They operate in a wide 
range of manufacturing and service industries, ranging from chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
and biotechnology to software development, among others. They are broadly grouped into 
two sectors: manufacturing, which accounted for 44% and included energy, petroleum, and 
refining; and service, which accounted for the other 56%. We find that market-seeking is the 
predominant FDI motive for these subsidiaries. 
The results of a non-response bias test (independent t-test, two-tailed) confirmed that there 
were no significant differences across key attributes (sales, assets, and employees, data of 
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2008) between the parent firms of the respondent and non-respondent subsidiaries at a 5% 
significant level. Furthermore, we compared the data characteristics of early and late 
respondents, and we found no significant differences between these two groups. Our careful 
procedure here is in line with Armstrong and Overton (1977), who argue that late 
respondents represent non-respondents. 
The sample size of 101 subsidiaries is sufficient for our empirical tests for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is enough for a total population of 504 foreign subsidiaries, which is required for 
continuous data (Barlett, Kotrlik, & Higgins, 2001). Secondly, it satisfies the ratio of 
observations to independent variables, which should not fall below five for multiple 
regression analysis. This helps ensure that the results are not too specific to the sample (Hair, 
Anderson, Babin, & Black, 2010). Therefore, the sample is statistically sufficient, given that 
there are 11 variables (four independent and seven control variables) in our regressions. 
Additionally, the inclusion of a broad range of ASEAN countries enhances the 
generalisability of our findings. 
4.2 Secondary data 
We also use public data, specifically the Economic Freedom of the World Index from the 
reports published by the Fraser Institute, Vancouver, Canada. The data in the index comes 
from more than 70 think tanks around the world (The_Fraser_Institute, 2015). This index is 
designed to measure the consistency of a nation’s policies and institutions with economic 
freedom. The role of economic freedom has been studied extensively in the economic growth 
literature, with the consensus being that several elements of economic freedom enhance 
economic performance at the macro level (Barro, 1991; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Easton & 
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Walker, 1997; Greenaway, Morgan, & Wright, 2002) (for a comprehensive literature review, 
see Hall and Lawson (2014)). 
The index is comprised of five composite sub-indexes, which are rated on a scale of 0-10 
with a higher value meaning representing better quality. In this study, we use ‘sound money’ 
sub-index, which represents access to sound money. Access to sound money includes 
composite measurements of money growth, standard deviation of inflation, inflation of the 
most recent year, and freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. On the other hand, 
‘credit market regulations’ sub-index, which considers the regulation of credit markets and 
includes composite measurements of ownership of banks, private-sector credit, and interest 
rate controls/negative real interest rate controls (for detailed information, see appendix of 
explanatory notes and data sources, The_Fraser_Institute (2015)). 
4.3 Variables and metrics 
Dependent variable: Export intensity ratio (ExportInt) 
Previous studies in the IB literature use the ratio of export sales to total sales in order to 
measure export intensity (Almodóvar & Rugman, 2014, 2015; Estrin et al., 2008; Salomon 
& Shaver, 2005). We adopt an accounting-based approach, asking the managers of 
participating subsidiaries to report the approximate percentage of the aggregate value of 
export sales over the aggregate value of total sales of their subsidiaries during the period of 
2003-2007. Subsequently, we use an average ratio to neutralise variance over time (Grant, 
Jammine, & Thomas, 1988). 
Our measurement of export intensity ratio using survey data is aligned with the IE literature. 
In a study of the intensive and extensive margins of trade in the U.S. context by Coughlin 
(2012), the intensive margin refers to the average exports per firm, whereas the extensive 
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margin refers to the number of exporting firms. Our study refers to the intensive margin of 
trade. 
Independent variables: Internal and external debt finance (Intra-firm_loans & Bank_loans) 
We apply the international financial reporting standard conceptual framework and the 
international accounting standard IAS24-Related Party Disclosures (IAS24) to develop this 
construct. We asked the managers of participating subsidiaries to report the approximate 
percentages of major financing sources of the subsidiary’s capital. These included retained 
earnings, intra-firm borrowing from parent firms and/or sister affiliates, capital investment 
from the parent firms, borrowing from local banks; borrowing from venture capital and 
international financial institutions in the host countries, and borrowing from international 
banks and international financial institutions outside the host countries. In this study, we 
focus on intra-firm loans (Intra-firm_loans) from MNE internal capital markets and bank 
loans (Bank_loans) from external financial institutions as trade finance sources to fund 
exports. 
Independent variable: Perceived concerns with foreign exchange risks (FX_concerns) 
Subsidiary managers were asked whether or not they were concerned about FX risks when 
they engaged in export activities. We use a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the answer 
was yes and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variable: Use of foreign exchange risk management techniques 
(FX_management) 
Subsidiary managers were asked whether or not they implemented any measures to manage 
FX risks. These included working with the corporate treasury in the HQs to centrally manage 
FX risks. They also included achieving the same purpose by hedging locally using forward 
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and option contracts, as well as alternative solutions, such as local sourcing of inputs like 
materials, parts, components, services, and so on (Bowe et al., 2010; Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a; Rugman & Collinson, 2012; Verbeke, 2013). We use a dummy variable and assigned 
the value of 1 if the answer was yes and 0 otherwise.   
Control variable: Host-country business environment (SoundMoney_index) 
Previous studies show that host-country business environmental factors influence subsidiary 
exports (Estrin et al., 2008; Gao, Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010; Li, Vertinsky, & Zhang, 
2013; Salomon & Shaver, 2005). We use the average Economic Freedom of the World 
Index, specifically the ‘access to sound’ money sub-index for the period 2003-2007, to 
measure the quality of the host country-specific advantages where the subsidiaries are 
located. This helps to account for the fact that Singapore is a developed country, whereas 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are developing countries. 
Control variable: Relatedness to parent firms’ activities (Relatedness_parent) 
Foreign subsidiaries can draw upon the product-specific knowledge of their parent firms 
when their activities are related to those of their parents (Li, 1995; Slangen & Hennart, 
2008). The information provided by subsidiary managers was triangulated with the 
information in the OneSource database. We follow the procedures outlined in Slangen and 
Hennart (2008) to create a dummy variable, which assumes a value of 0 if the subsidiary 
performed related activities and assumes the value of 1 if the subsidiary performed unrelated 
activities. 
Control variable: Subsidiary age (Subsidiary_age) 
This variable captures the host-country cumulative experience of foreign subsidiaries (Autio, 
Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000). It is measured by determining the number of years in operation 
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since foundation. It is coded in such a way that a value of 1 represents it being established 
in the 2000s and later, and a value of 7 represents it being established since 1880.  
Control variable: Subsidiary size (Subsidiary_size) 
Previous studies show that subsidiary size is a critical control variable (Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a). It is measured by calculating the number of employees. It is coded in such a way 
that a value of 1 represents there being fewer than 500 employees, whereas a value of 7 
represents there being more than 2,000.  
Control variable: Subsidiary autonomy (Subsidiary_autonomy) 
The literature on subsidiary management emphasises the role of the subsidiary in knowledge 
creation and knowledge transfer. Subsidiary autonomy facilitates this process (Kostova, 
Marano, & Tallman, 2016). To assess the degree of subsidiary autonomy, we follow the 
approaches used by previous studies of Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), Roth and Morrison 
(1992), and Slangen and Hennart (2008). Subsidiary managers were asked to self-assess their 
subsidiaries’ level of freedom to make decisions related to a wide range of functions without 
the HQs’ involvement. These included the following: supply chains (key suppliers, 
production/service delivery process), sales, marketing, and distribution (product/service 
offerings, customer relationship management, advertising, promotion, and brands); human 
resources management (selection, recruitment, remuneration, training, and development of 
employees); international financial management, and host-country stakeholder relationship 
management. We use a Likert 5-point scale with the following values: 1=decisions 
exclusively made by the HQ, 2=decisions largely made by the HQ, 3=shared decisions, 
4=decisions largely made by subsidiary; and 5=decisions exclusively made by subsidiary. 
The scale reliability test shows a Cronbach alpha of 0.870. 
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Control variable: Parent firm size (Parent_size) 
The core resources of a foreign subsidiary are often transferred from the parent firm, which 
might affect subsidiary export intensity (Estrin et al., 2008). This variable is measured by 
recording the number of employees of the parent firms. Data is sourced from OneSource and 
is coded as 1=10,000 employees and 7=70,000 employees or more. 
Control variable: Sectors (Sectors) 
Sectors tend to have different export dynamics. As stated by Makino, Isobe, and Chan 
(2004), Hansen and Gwozdz (2015), and Venaik, Midgley, and Devinney (2005), industry 
effects and country effects are difficult to be untangled, and sector features may vary 
between countries. Thus, as sectors’ effects might have the potential to confound the results 
of our study, we used a dummy variable where 1=manufacturing and 0=service. 
4.4 Econometric model 
This study analyses the impact of trade finance variables on subsidiaries’ export intensity. 
In order to explore our sample in depth, we initially use a multiple linear regression model 
as a departure point for the full analysis (Greene, 2002). Next, we apply more sophisticated 
techniques, such as censored regression (Tobit) models and fractional response regression 
models. 
4.4.1 First Part: Initial Empirical Analysis 
As our dependent variable is measured at the continuous level, we use a multiple linear 
regression (Ordinary least squares -OLS-) model. This technique analyses the linear 
relationship between a dependent variable and several independent and control variables. 
The generic form is as follows: 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖; i=1…N (subsidiaries), where 𝑦𝑖  is the 
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dependent/explained variable -export intensity-; 𝑥𝑖
′  are the explanatory variables (intra-firm 
loans, bank loans, perceived concerns of FX risks, use of FX management, and control 
variables); 𝛽  is the vector of unknown parameters; and 𝜀𝑖 is a random disturbance. We test 
whether our model suffers from heteroscedasticity by using the Breusch-Pagan test, where 
the null hypothesis is that residuals are homoscedastic. We reject the H0 (p-value<0.001) and 
conclude that residuals are not homogeneous. One way to deal with this problem is by using 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that British subsidiaries located in the same Asian 
country also share unobservable features that would cause our regression disturbances to be 
correlated. Following Moulton (1986, 1990), Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), and 
Kezdi (2004), we cannot assure the independence of these observations, and we need to relax 
the independence assumption and require only that the observations (subsidiaries) be 
independent across the clusters (countries). Our final model is a multiple linear regression 
model with cluster effects by country and robust standard errors. This model relaxes the 
homoscedasticity assumption and allows the error terms to be heteroscedastic and correlated 
within groups/clusters. Thus, subsidiaries can be separated into M groups G1, G2, . . ., GM 
which are independent. The formula for the robust estimator of variance when there are 
cluster effects is as follows (Stata, 2015): ?̂? = ?̂?(∑ 𝑢𝑘
(𝐺)′
𝑢𝑘
(𝐺)𝑀
𝐾=1 )?̂? where ?̂? =
(−𝜕2𝑙𝑛/𝜕𝛽2)-1 is the conventional estimator of variance; and, 𝑢𝑘
(𝐺)
 is the contribution of the 
kth group to 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿/𝜕𝛽. 
According to Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood (2012), we need to consider the potential 
existence of endogeneity as we allow for the potential endogeneity concerns of higher 
exports leading to higher external borrowing, e.g. subsidiaries which export can borrow 
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more easily. We adopt an instrumental variable approach for our model. We use an 
instrumental variable for bank loans that is measured by the average Economic Freedom of 
the World, calculated by the Fraser Institute. Specifically, we use the ‘credit market 
regulation’ sub-index for the five-year period of 2003-2007. This instrumental variable is a 
multi-item composite construct comprised of measurements of bank ownership, private-
sector credit, and interest rate controls/ negative real interest rate controls. The data sources 
come from 70 think tanks around the world, including the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators; the World Bank’s bank regulations and supervision survey; the 
IMF’s international financial statistics; and the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. The correlation matrix (Table 3) shows that the credit market 
regulation sub-index is positively related with external bank loans and this relationship is 
significant, which indicates instrumental variable acceptability. We use the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, which compares the instrumental variable and OLS estimates to determine 
whether they are “similar enough” (H0: all variables are exogenous). There is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null (p-value=0.5169), so our OLS regressors are exogenous, and our 
estimations are consistent and unbiased. 
4.4.2 Second Part: Complementary Empirical Analysis 
As our continuous dependent variable is a percentage that ranges from 0 to 100, two 
alternative statistical techniques will refine our results: 
We consider the family of censored regression (Tobit) models. Inside this Tobit family, we 
perform two variations. Firstly, we perform a Tobit model with cluster effects, where the 
general formulation is 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖; 𝑦𝑖 = 0 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 0 ; 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
∗ if 0≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 100; and 
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𝑦𝑖 = 100 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 100. Here, y* is the latent dependent variable subsidiary export intensity. 
The vector of exogenous regressors is represented by x', and the vector of unknown 
parameters is represented by 𝛽 ; 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
Secondly, a Tobit multiplicative heteroscedasticity regression with cluster effects. 
Maddala and Nelson (1975) and Hurd (1979) note that models can improve their efficiency 
if heteroscedasticity is properly specified. As we allow for the possibility that robust standard 
errors do not completely solve heteroscedasticity, we replicate our model under this Tobit 
variation. Following Harvey (1976) and Greene (2002), our formulation assumes a variance 
of the 𝜀𝑖: 𝜎𝑖
2 = exp(𝑧𝑖
′𝛿) where 𝛿 is a second vector of coefficients; and 𝑧𝑖
′ represents a 
second vector of independent variables. 𝑧𝑖
′ may or may not be identical to 𝑥𝑖
′ (Greene, 1993).  
Another suitable technique, when the dependent variable is a proportion/fraction is the 
family of Fractional Response Regression models. Papke and Wooldridge (1993) implement 
quasi-likelihood estimators to obtain robust estimators, and they propose direct models for 
the conditional mean to keep the predicted values in the unit interval (endpoint outcomes of 
zero and one are allowed). Thus, we divide our “ExportInt” variable by 100 to obtain a 
continuous dependent variable that ranges from 0 to 1. Firstly, we use a fractional response 
model with cluster effects, the general specification of which is as follows. 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) =
Φ(𝑥′𝑖𝛽), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, where 0≤𝑦𝑖≤1 is the dependent variable, and Φ(.) is a probit 
distribution function that leads to computationally simple estimators when unobserved 
heterogeneity appears (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). Secondly, as our model suffers from 
heteroscedasticity, we also fit a fractional heteroscedastic probit regression with cluster 
effects, where the functional form Φ(𝑥′𝑖𝛽) is replaced by Φ {
𝑥′𝑖𝛽
exp (𝑧𝑖
′𝛿) ⁄ }. 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the details of internal and external debt financing sources that could be used 
as trade finance sources to support subsidiary export intensity. Intra-firm loans account for 
8% of total funding. External bank loans account for 7% of total funding, of which borrowing 
from local banks in the host countries is 4%, borrowing from venture capital in the host 
countries is 1%, and borrowing from international banks outside of the host countries is 2%. 
In total, intra-firm loans and external bank loans account for 15% of total funding for these 
subsidiaries. 
Insert_Table_2_about_here 
One relevant assumption is that independent/control variables are not perfectly 
multicollinear. If multicollinearity exists, standard errors would be inflated and would 
produce unstable parameter estimates. We use different mechanisms to evaluate this aspect. 
Firstly, Hair et al. (2010) suggest that correlation among independent/control variables 
should be below 0.5. Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and Pearson’s 
correlations of independent and control variables. Pearson’s pair-wise correlations are all 
lower than the threshold of 0.5, except for the correlation between “Intra-firm_loans” and 
“Bank_loans” (-0.57). To further examine the severity of multicollinearity, we have used the 
variance inflation factor, which is an index that measures how much variance of an estimated 
regression coefficient is increased because of multicollinearity. Individual values are all 
below 1.8, well under the recommended cut-off point of 10. Moreover, the average value is 
1.31, again under the threshold of 5. Thus, all of the diagnostic tests indicate that there is no 
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serious threat for multicollinearity (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2015; Neter, Wasserman, 
& Kutner, 1989). 
Insert_Table_3_about_here 
5.2 Initial Empirical Analysis: Hypotheses testing 
Table 4 reports the results from multiple linear regression models with cluster effects which 
are estimated on the relationship between trade finance availability and subsidiary export 
intensity. In order to evaluate the consistency and robustness of the results depending on the 
variables included, we present: Model 1 that introduces only the independent variables; 
Model 2 that reports results for the control variables; and Model 3 that presents the results 
for the full model. Coefficients and significance levels remain stable, except for 
“Bank_loans” which is not significant in Model 1 (see Section 5.3 for further discussion). 
Thus, we test if Models 1 and 2 are nested on Model 3. Because we estimate our models 
with robust standard errors clustered by country, our observations are not independent and 
the “likelihoods” do not reflect this. Korn and Graubard (1990) explain that standard 
likelihood-ratio tests should not be performed in this situation. Instead, we should use F-tests 
(or Wald tests) with p-values adjusted by the Bonferroni correction. Our p-values are all 
lower than 0.001, meaning that excluding the independent or control variables would 
significantly reduce the fit of the models. Thus, we focus on Model 3 to discuss the results 
and hypotheses. 
We also check the goodness of fit. Thus, the p-values of our models are all lower than 0.001, 
meaning that we can state that at least one predictor is statistically different from zero. 
Regarding the coefficient of determination, R^2 is a statistical measure of how close data 
are to the fitted regression. Model 3 shows the best model fit where our variables explain 
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37.56% of the variance in ExportInt. Adjusted R^2 is the same as R^2 but adjusted by the 
number of subsidiaries and variables. This more conservative measure shows that Model 3 
explains 29.8% of the variation in ExportInt. 
Finally, following Stock and Watson (2003), we need to evaluate whether our model suffers 
from omitted variables, as this would bias the OLS estimator ( 𝐸(𝛽 ) ≠ 𝛽 ). We use the 
Ramsey-Reset test, where H0 states that the model has no omitted variables, so we fail to 
reject the null (p-value=0.2726) and conclude that our model is not biased. 
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Both H1a, which predicts that intra-firm loans are positively associated with a subsidiary’s 
export intensity, and H1b, which predicts that external bank loans are positively related to a 
subsidiary’s export intensity, are fully supported. Our results confirm that for every 1% 
increase in the subsidiary-level ratio of intra-firm loans (holding all other variables constant), 
the ratio of subsidiary export intensity increases by 3.05%. This impact is significant (p-
value<0.001) and positive, as predicted by H1a. In the same line, the coefficient for Bank-
loans is significant (p-value<0.01) and positive, meaning that a subsidiary’s export intensity 
will on average increase by 1.23% for every 1% increase in external bank loans. This finding 
supports H1b. These results are consistent with previous studies in the IE literature on the 
important roles of credit finance and trade finance in international trading activities (Antràs 
& Foley, 2015; Manova, 2013; Manova et al., 2015). 
We also find support for H2a which predicts that subsidiary managers’ concerns about FX 
risks are negatively associated with a subsidiary’s export intensity. Thus, the export intensity 
is 22.92% lower (p-value<0.001) in subsidiaries that are concerned about FX risk than those 
that are not concerned. In the same line, H2b, which predicts that the use of FX management 
 38 
is positively associated with a subsidiary’s export intensity, is fully supported. The 
coefficient is statistically significant and positive (p-value<0.01). It means that the export 
intensity is 14.16% higher in subsidiaries that use FX risk management than in those that do 
not. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficient of perceived concerns about FX risks and 
the use of FX management in the full Model 3 suggest that FX risk concerns are negatively 
associated with a subsidiary’s export intensity. However, they can be addressed by using FX 
management developed by the subsidiary. 
The results related to the control variables are also interesting. We find that most control 
variables, including subsidiary age and size, have insignificant relationships with a 
subsidiary’s export intensity. The only two control variables that are significant (p-
values<0.001) and positively related to a subsidiary’s export intensity are 
“Relatedness_parent” and “SoundMoney_Index”. This is consistent with previous studies in 
the IB literature (Estrin et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2010; Li et al., 2013; Salomon & Shaver, 
2005). 
When countries improve one unit, their SoundMoney_index (progress in providing access 
to sound money) ExportInt experiences a significant boost of 10.63% on average. Export 
intensity is on average 19.50% higher in subsidiaries that perform activities that are unrelated 
to the parent company (p-value<0.001). Parent firm size exhibits no significant relationship 
with subsidiary export intensity. Our findings suggest that it is not sufficient to rely on 
economies of scale and knowledge of relatedness to parent-firm activities to boost export 
intensity at the subsidiary level. This reinforces the necessity of developing new knowledge-
based LB FSAs (SSAs) in host countries, integrating with the existing knowledge base of 
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the parent firm, and exploiting the enhanced and integrated knowledge bundles effectively 
(Nguyen, 2015; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015a, b; Verbeke, 2013). 
The degree of subsidiary autonomy has an insignificant relationship with subsidiary export 
intensity. This finding is consistent with McDonald, Warhurst, and Allen (2008) and Nguyen 
and Rugman (2015a), who find limited evidence for positive relationships between different 
forms of autonomy and subsidiary performance. Autonomy can lead foreign subsidiaries to 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004), potentially exercise 
bargaining power and influence over their parent firms and sister affiliates (Birkinshaw, 
1997; Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & Kappen, 2012; Chen, Chen, & Ku, 2012; Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2011). Taggart and Hood (1999) suggest that autonomy should not be seen 
as an end in itself. Our findings suggest that ASEAN subsidiaries focus on financing 
solutions to support their export activities, rather than seeking bargaining power over their 
parent firms through autonomy per se. 
Finally, sector is not significantly related to subsidiary export intensity. A plausible 
explanation for this is that ASEAN member countries have long pursued international trade 
liberalisation policies and support multinational subsidiaries’ export activities. Thus, 
subsidiaries have accumulated experience in dealing with intensified competition, they have 
become familiar with the structure of these industries and sectors, and they have developed 
sector-specific knowledge to operate successfully in national and international markets. 
5.3 Complementary Empirical Analysis: Hypotheses testing 
We conduct additional statistical analyses to research our hypotheses in depth and to rule 
out alternative explanations. Table 5 displays results for Tobit models with cluster effects 
(Tobit), a Tobit multiplicative heteroscedasticity regression with cluster effects (HET Tobit), 
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fractional response models with cluster effects (FracRes), and a fractional hereroscedastic 
probit with cluster effects (HET FracRes). 
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Consistently with the previous section, Models 1 include only independent variables; Models 
2 include control variables; and Models 3 include full model specifications. With regard to 
robustness, coefficient signs and significance levels remain stable across the eight models.2 
Hence, we can conclude that Table 5’s models are consistent and robust. Furthermore, 
Wald/F-tests are all significant (p-values<0.001). Therefore, we can assume that our models, 
as a whole, fit significantly better than an empty model. According to McFadden (1978), 
pseudo-R^2 values from 0.2 to 0.4 represent an excellent fit. HET Tobit presents 0.342, and 
it would thus represent the best model fit. 
If we compare Table 4 with Table 5, independent variables behave consistently and remain 
stable, except “Bank_loans”. Table 4 depicts “Bank_loans” as insignificant in Model 1 but 
significant in Model 3, while this predictor is insignificant in Table 5. Thus, when we run 
more sophisticated and demanding statistical procedures, “Bank_loans” is insignificant, and 
the behaviour of external bank loans is explained in the discussion section. Nevertheless, we 
obtain significant support for hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H2b. These three hypotheses 
maintain the sign and the significant effect on export intensity. If we statistically compare 
the magnitude of coefficients, we can state that FX_concerns have the greatest impact on 
ExportInt, followed by FX_management and Intra-firm_loans, respectively. Table 4 and 
Table 5 support this. Regarding control variables, “SoundMoney_index”, 
“Relatedness_parent”, and “Sectors” are significant and positive. 
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We also conduct additional robustness tests. Firstly, we perform the interaction term between 
intra-firm loans and bank loans, as well as the interaction term between concerns about FX 
risks and the use of FX exchange management. However, the unreported results for these 
relationships are insignificant. In other words, the explanatory variables are directly 
associated with the dependent variable, as predicted in our hypotheses. 
Secondly, we test the moderating effects of subsidiary autonomy on the relationship between 
internal and external debt finance, FX management, and subsidiary export intensity. 
Autonomy is an important variable in the subsidiary management and subsidiary-parent 
relationship literature (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). We find that the relationships are 
statistically insignificant, and we do not report the results here. 
Thirdly, we run moderating effects of host-country economic freedom, the access to sound 
money sub-index by the Fraser Institute on the relationship between external bank loans and 
export intensity. We do not report the results because they are statistically insignificant.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between subsidiary-level retained earnings (as an 
alternative trade financing source) and export intensity. We find that the relationship is 
statistically insignificant. Due to space constraints, we do not report the results here. The 
empirical findings confirm our earlier theoretical proposition that export intensity cannot be 
funded through retained earnings. 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this study, we examine the relationships between intra-firm loans and external bank loans 
as trade finance sources and the export intensity of a foreign subsidiary using survey data of 
ASEAN subsidiaries of British MNEs. We initially find that both intra-firm loans and bank 
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loans are instrumental in supporting subsidiary export intensity. We discuss the important 
role of intra-firm loans. Foreign subsidiaries have access to MNE internal capital markets, 
which help them to overcome the challenge of limited access to external credit finance due 
to thin and shallow capital markets in ASEAN countries (Nguyen, 2013; Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a). Our findings confirm the important role of MNE internal capital markets from the 
perspective of “classic” internalisation theory (Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2008; Aulakh & 
Mudambi, 2005; Desai et al., 2004; Gugler et al., 2013; Mudambi, 1999; Nguyen & Rugman, 
2015a; Rugman, 1980). 
Our results also resonate with previous studies on multinational activity and the role of 
internal debt finance. Desai et al. (2004) find that the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNEs use 
internal capital markets to overcome liquidity constraints in external capital markets and 
react to profitable opportunities. They raise less external finance in financially 
underdeveloped countries and compensate by borrowing more from the parent company. 
They can respond to credit-market imperfections in order to relax constraints faced by input 
suppliers (Antràs et al., 2009). Our empirical evidence is also consistent with Manova et al. 
(2015), who find that multinational subsidiaries are less credit constrained because they can 
access funding from internal capital markets. Overall, our study is amongst the first to 
provide direct evidence of the role of intra-firm loans and the use export intensity as a 
particular dimension of subsidiary performance and quantify its statistical significance. 
On the other hand, intra-firm loans are often viewed as one of the potential mechanisms used 
by MNEs to manipulate profits of their foreign subsidiaries by charging high interest rates, 
which are tax deductible for corporate income tax declaration, thus reducing taxes in 
relatively high-tax host countries. However, in business reality, governments in Southeast 
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Asian countries have become more sophisticated in their use of legal regulations to curb the 
tax avoidance schemes of MNEs. The interest rates of intra-firm loans must be in compliance 
with the arm’s length price standard, referring to external comparable interest rates in open 
market transactions between unrelated borrowers and lenders, as well as the transfer pricing 
documentation requirements as per OECD guidelines. For example, in business practice, the 
interest rate on a short-term three-month or six-month intra-firm loan/group undertaking is 
often based on a three-month or six-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 
certain basis points for risk premium. 
In addition, we obtained the insights of the participating subsidiary managers during our data 
collection process. They emphasise that corporate reputation, local legitimacy, and 
relationships with host-country governments are important factors that must be taken into 
consideration. They also indicate that any aggressive tax planning in related party 
transactions, such as intra-firm loans which could result in news headlines in the mass media, 
detrimentally impact the image, the survival, and the profitability of foreign subsidiaries. 
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that ASEAN subsidiaries of British MNEs use 
intra-firm loans to support efficiency-based and value-creating activities, such as exports, 
rather than for value appropriation and tax avoidance purposes (Penrose, 1959). 
However, bank loans do not remain significant when more demanding statistical techniques 
are applied. A plausible explanation for this result can be derived from the findings of the 
survey (Table 2). Foreign subsidiaries have to raise external bank loans from multiple 
countries, which is to say both inside and outside of the host countries. The weak support 
for external bank loans suggests that subsidiaries have trouble accessing external bank loans 
due to limited credit availability in host countries. Consequently, the cost of external debt 
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financing increases (Desai et al., 2004), and the role of external debt finance becomes 
insignificant. 
On the other hand, foreign subsidiaries must take into consideration the fact that the level of 
debt in the capital structure of subsidiaries should not cause the capital structure of parent 
firms to deviate from acceptable standards in the home countries, as parent firms’ shares are 
usually listed and traded there (Rugman & Collinson, 2012). The external debt finance of 
foreign subsidiaries is consolidated in parent firms’ balance sheets and thus affects both the 
leverage level and the cost of capital for the MNEs as a whole (Madura, 2011). The external 
debt financing of foreign subsidiaries can also affect the MNEs’ overall exposure to 
exchange rate risks, and it, therefore, influences the risk premium on capital and the cost of 
capital (Madura, 2011). More debt also increases a firm’s liquidity risks (Mishra & Tannous, 
2010). The low ratio of external debt of ASEAN subsidiaries suggests that these foreign 
subsidiaries have to balance their financial resource needs with the acceptable capital 
structure norms of their parent firms. 
Our study is among the first attempts to demarcate the forms of intra-firm loans, external 
bank loans, and subsidiary export intensity, which is a new theoretical and empirical critical 
contribution. Foley and Manova (2015) find that previous studies of international trade and 
multinational activity that introduce corporate finance considerations do not distinguish 
financing sources. Analyses of the impact of firms’ needs to fund export costs generally 
consider the overall availability of capital without demarcating the forms that this capital 
might take, despite the fact that this is highly relevant for managers (Foley & Manova, 2015). 
Overall, we demonstrate that ASEAN subsidiaries develop sustainable export financing 
strategies. They innovatively and effectively utilise, combine, and exploit intra-firm loans 
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from MNE internal capital markets and bank loans from external financial institutions (if 
accessible and available) in supporting their export intensity. Furthermore, we find that 
subsidiaries develop necessary FX management techniques to deal with concerns 
surrounding FX risks. Ultimately, it reflects the subsidiary-level financial management 
capabilities to enhance export intensity despite thin and shallow capital markets and credit 
constraints in the host countries. In this way, we extend “new” internalisation theory by 
conceptualising and providing new empirical evidence for subsidiary trade finance being a 
valuable SSA (a type of LB FSA). 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
7.1 Implications for Practice 
Our findings have substantive practical implications for subsidiary managers and 
policymakers. Firstly, subsidiaries are recommended to use internal and debt finance (if 
accessible and available) to enhance their export intensity because this is a sustainable export 
financing strategy. The availability of these critical financial resources enables subsidiaries 
to fund the fixed costs of export production, as well as working capital, and the financial 
liquidity requirements of export operations. 
Secondly, we show that MNE foreign subsidiaries promote host-country economic 
development through the use of their internal debt finance to grow export intensity (mainly 
to external customers), which ultimately contributes to the balance of payments and 
international competitiveness of the host countries. Therefore, public policies encouraging 
inward FDI, trade liberalisation, and economic freedom are needed. In addition, policies 
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facilitating routine access to external debt finance to support export activities would be 
useful for both local firms and multinational subsidiaries. 
7.2 Implications for theory 
We build upon “new” internalisation theory in the IB literature and incorporate insights into 
international trade finance from the IE literature to investigate the relationship between the 
role of trade finance availability and export intensity at the subsidiary level. We have 
developed a theory-driven explanation of export intensity that is derived from the 
development of subsidiary-level capabilities in combining and utilising intra-firm loans from 
MNE internal capital markets and bank loans from external financial institutions inside and 
outside the host countries in supporting export intensity. We also examine the subsidiary-
level development of FX risk management to deal with perceived concerns about FX risks 
in export transactions. We empirically test our hypotheses by using survey data of foreign 
subsidiaries of British MNEs in six ASEAN countries. We show that foreign subsidiaries 
have in-depth knowledge of the challenges of underdeveloped financial markets in the host 
countries, and we demonstrate how they develop sustainable financing strategies that drive 
export intensity. We theorise, test, and find empirical evidence that the subsidiary-level 
capability to combine internal and (to some extent) external debt financial resources in an 
effective and innovative way to enhance export intensity is a conceptually relevant SSA (LB 
FSA). As such, we extend “new” internalisation theory in a novel and original manner. Thus, 
we hope that the results of our study provide a useful platform from which to advance future 
theory development regarding trade finance as a driver of subsidiary export intensity. 
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A subsidiary perspective demands that the IB field takes a fresh look at how we theorise this 
phenomenon by more consciously analysing the subsidiary’s engagement in exports beyond 
host-country national markets and especially the subsidiary-level capabilities in developing 
sustainable export financing strategies. Our study has attempted to make a new contribution 
to the IB literature. We believe that an understanding of the role of trade finance in export 
intensity adds new insights for both IB theory and practice. Our study provides a new 
departure point for future research avenues. 
7.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Our study is subject to several limitations. Firstly, we focus on the subsidiaries of the largest 
British MNEs. The findings that emerge from our study might only reflect the behaviours of 
large Western multinational subsidiaries operating in the ASEAN countries. We suggest that 
future research might examine subsidiaries of MNEs from North America, Europe, and the 
Asia-Pacific area that have active operations in ASEAN countries. The results could then be 
compared with our findings. 
Secondly, we use data from a questionnaire survey with complementary information on the 
parent firms derived from archival and public data sources for country-level factors. This 
approach of using both primary and secondary data sources is necessary. We focus on factors 
within the control of subsidiary managers (subsidiary-level explanatory variables) and 
control for the potential effects of country-level variables because we adopt a subsidiary’s 
perspective. Future research may follow the traditional economic approach of a gravity 
model using country-level explanatory variables, such as geographical distance (e.g. freight 
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costs), cultural ties (e.g. former colonies), institutional and political ties (e.g. Commonwealth 
membership), and trade openness. 
Thirdly, there are several promising directions for future research. Some elements of this 
work would benefit from additional study. Cross-country differences in capital access and 
taxation influence various strategic decisions of MNE foreign subsidiaries. We focus on how 
foreign subsidiaries fund their export activities and demarcate internal and external debt 
finance sources and how to deal with perceived concerns surrounding FX risks. Further work 
at the intersection of IB and international trade finance would enlighten our understanding 
of foreign subsidiary strategies. Future research may examine other topics. These could 
include what a subsidiary’s export orientation is (e.g. exports to third-party external 
customers and arm-length’s trade versus exports to internal customers and intra-firm trade), 
as well as the types of export products (e.g. finished goods or intermediate goods). Another 
area of focus could be whether transfer pricing manipulation in intra-firm trade and intra-
firm loans for tax planning purpose is a primary objective. Finally, the ways that export 
orientation affects trade finance arrangements could be considered. 
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Table 1: Sample Structure by Countries and Sectors 
 
Countries 
British subsidiaries  
(percent) 
Sectors 
Manufacturers (percent) Services (percent) 
Indonesia 18 39 61 
Malaysia 13 46 54 
Singapore 26 35 65 
Thailand 15 53 47 
The Philippines 10 50 50 
Vietnam 18 50 50 
Total 101 subsidiaries 44 56 
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Table 2. Intra-firm loans and bank loans of foreign subsidiaries in the ASEAN bloc 
 
Intra-firm loans and external bank loans Percent  Percent 
Intra-firm borrowing, i.e. loans from sister affiliates and/or parent firms  8  
Intra-firm loans from MNE internal capital markets  8 
Borrowing from banks in the host countries (1) 4  
Borrowing from venture capitalists in the host countries (2) 1  
Borrowing from international banks outside the host countries (3) 2  
Bank loans from external financial institutions (1) + (2) + (3)  7 
Note: n = 101. Data is collected from a survey. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Intra-firm_loans 7.77 2.92 1            
2 Bank_loans 7.01 2.89 -0.57 1           
3 FX_concerns 0.17 0.38 -0.04 -0.05 1          
4 FX_management 0.50 0.50 -0.04 -0.02 0.46 1         
5 SoundMoney_index 7.90 1.33 0.05 -0.39 -0.02 0.04 1        
6 Relatedness_ parent 0.02 0.17 0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 1       
7 Subsidiary_age 2.62 1.26 0.24 -0.19 -0.10 -0.10 0.05 -0.04 1      
8 Subsidiary_size 1.62 1.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.11 -0.18 -0.04 0.26 1     
9 Subsidiary_autonomy 3.36 0.79 0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.07 1    
10 Parent_ size 3.29 2.56 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.19 -0.02 0.33 0.37 -0.01 1   
11 Sectors 0.43 0.49 -0.08 0.05 -0.20 -0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.14 1  
12 CreditMarket_index 9.19 0.57 0.25 0.26 -0.08 -0.09 0.06 0.17 0.14 -0.06 -0.00 -0.23 -0.02 1 
Note: n=101. 
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Table 4. Multiple Linear Regression Model with Cluster Effects by Country 
  Dependent Variable: ExportInt[0,100] 
  Model I Model II Model III 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Intra-firm_loans 
4.24 **   3.05 *** 
(1.35)    (0.45)  
Bank_loans 
1.57    1.23 ** 
(1.37)    (0.26)  
FX_concerns 
-27.38 **   -22.92 *** 
(9.48)    (3.21)  
FX_management 
15.48 *   14.16 ** 
(7.23)    (3.29)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
SoundMoney_index 
  11.52 ** 10.63 *** 
  (2.13)  (0.97)  
Relatedness_parent 
  21.76 *** 19.50 *** 
  (3.19)  (1.94)  
Subsidiary_age 
  0.81  -1.06  
  (2.17)  (2.33)  
Subsidiary_size 
  -3.60  -1.70  
  (2.39)  (1.61)  
Subsidiary_autonomy 
  1.44  0.86  
  (2.27)  (1.21)  
Parent_size 
  -1.80  -1.47  
  (1.01)  (1.25)  
Sectors 
  6.85  6.00  
  (3.61)  (4.00)  
Constant 
-19.88  -61.73 * -86.41 *** 
(17.97)  (17.05)  (8.32)  
R^2 
Adjusted R^2 
0.175 0.278 0.376 
0.141 0.224 0.298 
Pseudo R^2 0.019 0.033 0.047 
F-test (°) 61.44*** 14.11** 88.33*** 
Notes: n = 101.  
*p-value< 0.05; ** p-value< 0.01; *** p-value< 0.001  
() Robust standard errors clustered by country. 
(°) Bonferroni-adjusted p-values.  
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Table 5. Tobit and Fractional Response Models with Cluster Effects 
 Dependent Variable: ExportInt[0,100] Dependent Variable: ExportInt/100[0,1] 
 Tobit HET Tobit Fractional Response HET FracResp. 
 Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Intra-firm_loans 6.44 ** 
  5.32 *** 5.56 *** 0.13 ***   0.11 *** 0.08 ** 
(2.08)    (0.52)  (1.17)  (0.04)    (0.02)  (0.03)  
Bank_loans 1.11 
   0.43  0.43  0.05    0.01  0.01  
(2.26)    (0.35)  (1.16)  (0.04)    (0.02)  (0.02)  
FX_concerns -59.24 *** 
  -50.28 *** -56.89 ** -1.01 **   -0.98 *** -0.74 *** 
(17.25)    (12.84)  (18.41)  (0.37)    (0.20)  (0.11)  
FX_management 19.52 *** 
  19.76 *** 25.06 ** 0.48 *   0.51 ** 0.42 *** 
(5.35)    (18.41)  (8.32)  (0.23)    (0.16)  (0.09)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
  SoundMoney_index 
  16.66 *** 15.89 *** 15.18 ***   0.37 *** 0.37 *** 0.26 *** 
  (4.76)  (0.97)  (1.66)    (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.04)  
Relatedness_parent 
  44.16 *** 33.89 *** 32.52 *   0.62 *** 0.53 *** 0.49 *** 
  (6.67)  (4.54)  (15.75)    (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.13)  
Subsidiary_age 
  1.56  -3.22  -3.86    0.01  -0.07  -0.05  
  (4.02)  (4.35)  (3.50)    (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.05)  
Subsidiary_size 
  -7.31  -2.51  0.71    -0.19  -0.10  -0.02  
  (5.70)  (3.48)  (5.42)    (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.10)  
Subsidiary_autonomy 
  1.32  -0.96  -2.23    0.05  0.01  0.01  
  (3.89)  (1.42)  (2.25)    (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.03)  
Parent_size 
  -2.78 * -2.15  -0.44    -0.05  -0.05  0.01  
  (1.20)  (1.68)  (2.30)    (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
Sectors 
  19.01 * 17.56 * 19.33 *   0.28 * 0.28 + 0.19  
  (7.46)  (6.90)  (9.67)    (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.11)  
Constant -47.29 + -115.63 * -144.70 *** -146.61 *** -2.14 *** -3.43 *** -4.32 *** -3.32 *** 
28.35  (44.42)  (13.61)  (13.65)  (0.52)  (0.62)  (0.32)  (0.56)  
Pseudo R^2 0.035 0.045 0.074 0.342 0.100 0.155 0.223 0.186 
F-test//Wald-chi2(°) 136.27 *** 56.71 *** 309.33 *** 23.02 *** 72.26 *** 318.16 *** 166.98 *** 536.03 *** 
 42 left-censored; 57 uncensored; 2 right-censored observations         
Notes: n = 101.  //  +p-value<0.1; *p-value< 0.05; **p-value< 0.01; ***p-value< 0.001  //  () Robust standard errors clustered by country. // (°) Bonferroni-adjusted p-values. 
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1 Acronyms: ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; FSA=firm specific advantage; FX=foreign exchange; 
HQ=headquarter; IB=international business; IE=international economics; LB=location bound; MNE=multinational enterprise; 
SSA=subsidiary-specific advantage. 
2 Note that Tobit models’ dependent variable is “ExportInt”, while FracRes models use “ExportInt” divided by 100. This 
justifies the different magnitudes of coefficients. 
                                                          
